

A Shift to the Left

By Vyacheslav Cherepanov and Igor Cherepanov

The second parliamentary election in post-communist Russia was held on December 17, 1995. With nearly 65% of the potential voters casting ballots, this turnout marked a 10% increase over the 1993 election. While the high turnout is viewed as a positive development in an evolving democracy, the outcome speaks loudly of the economic and social growing pains occurring in Russia.

The Russian Parliament

As some background for the non-Russian scholar, the Russian Parliament consists of an upper house (the Federation Council) and a lower house (the State Duma). The Federation Council has 178 seats, held by the governors and heads of local legislatures from each of the 89 regions of Russia. The State Duma has 450 seats, held by elected deputies. According to Russian electoral law, voters in the Duma elections cast two votes, one for a "single-member" seat candidate, and the other for a national party from a party list. Half of the Duma seats are taken by candidates receiving a plurality in the "single-member" races, while the remaining half is divided proportionally among the political parties that reach a 5% threshold in the party-list voting. In the 1995 elections there were 43 parties comprising the party-list portion. Of these 43, only four overcame the 5% threshold: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), Our Home Is Russia (NDR), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Yabloko (see the election scorecard, p. 18).

A concern related to the 5% minimum is that, in essence, all votes for parties that did not reach this threshold are not counted. Of the four parties surpassing the 5% mark, overall they combined to get only 50% of the total party-list vote, yet will divide 100% of the party-list seats. This deficiency was not so obvious in the 1993 Duma elections, when there were only 13 parties on the party list, and those parties which did surpass the 5% threshold accounted for 87% of the votes.

In the future the 39 parties that did not reach 5% will have to consolidate to increase their political weight. Where many of these young political movements have yet to develop clearly defined goals, and with dozens of political parties holding similar positions on the direction of the country, in the end, consolidation will be the only answer for an efficient multi-party system. In such a system, each vote cast will be more meaningful. In the presidential election scheduled for this summer, the impact of any one of these 39 parties will be minimal without the formation of critical alliances.

One obvious observation from the 1995 Duma election is

that the Russian Parliament has shifted back to the communist left. This success is not just renewed interest in the left, but also a warning shot in protest of the socio-economic policies of the Yeltsin administration. Because of a steep decline in manufacturing and consequent high unemployment almost a quarter of the Russian population is living in poverty. These economic woes are symptomatic of why the NDR, principally composed of Yeltsin supporters, garnered only 10% of the party-list vote.

The Road to the Presidential Election

In April of 1993, Alexander Livshits, a Yeltsin economic aide, published his prediction for the coming two years. He argued, in effect, that the Russian people are conservative: they like a collective environment and will be reluctant to change occupations or lifestyles. Russian people will stay home and complain about inequalities and the rising level of unemployment. Russians tend to blame government, not themselves, for their problems, and will turn to the government for state support.

If any weight should be given to Livshits' prediction, then it was inevitable that after a heavy dose of democracy, there would be a natural shift of political course back to statism. However, the Duma elections should only be viewed as "round one" in this political evolution. With the presidential election just ahead, it won't be long to see if this movement was a correction for shifting too quickly to the right, or if the 1995 Duma outcome is only the beginning of a return to the left.

The Big Four

Although there are many political blocs and parties in the country, we can expect that there will not be many viable candidates for president. It is logical to assume that the strongest candidates will come from the four big political movements. With this in mind, let us take a more detailed look at these movements.

*The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)—
"the Left"*

Communists have celebrated the Duma election victory and related return to power, but have yet to determine the most effective way to utilize their new standing. The first decision with regard to exercising their influence was to elect Gennady

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1995 Duma Election Scorecard

Party name	Leader(s)	Ideology	Total seats, 1993	Total seats, 1995	1995		
					Single-member seats	Party-list seats	Party-list votes (percentage)
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)	G. Zyuganov	Left	45	157	57	100	22.3%
Our Home is Russia (NDR)	V. Chernomyrdin	Right	NA	55	10	45	10.1
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)	V. Zhirinovskiy	Nationalist	64	51	1	50	11.1
Yabloko	G. Yavlinsky	Liberal Democrat	25	45	14	31	6.9
The Agrarian Party of Russia (APR)	M. Lapshin A. Nazarchuck	Left	55	20	20	0	3.8
Russia's Democratic Choice (DVR)	Y. Gaidar	Liberal Democrat	76	9	9	0	3.9
Power to the People (VN)	S. Baburin N. Ryzhkov	National-Patriotic (left)	NA	9	9	0	2.1
Congress of Russian Communities (KRO)	Y. Skokov A. Lebed	Mainstream Nationalist (left)	NA	5	5	0	4.3
Women of Russia (Zhr)	A. Fedulova Y. Lakhova	Center-Left	23	3	3	0	4.6
Communists-Labor Russia-for the Soviet Union (KTRSS)	V. Anpilov	Far-Left	NA	1	1	0	4.5
Worker's Self-Management (PST)	S. Fyodorov A. Kazannik	Centrist	NA	1	1	0	4.0

Note: Only top parties are shown.
Source: The Russian Media, December 1995-January 1996.

Seleznev, a Communist deputy, as Speaker of the Duma. And with many other key offices in the Duma now filled with Communist representatives, this new majority will be able to move its political policies ahead. However, what these policies should be is currently being debated. The Communist party of today is not the same one which operated in the past totalitarian society. It is without a clearly defined direction, and there are differing opinions as to what objectives it should pursue.

One rather pessimistic assessment of how the Communists might proceed has come from Yegor Gaidar, the leader of Russia's Democratic Choice (DVR), which until the recent elections had held the majority in Duma. Gaidar thinks that the KPRF will take their newly

found power and within a year end up running the country. Gaidar is reminding the citizens of Russia that like other members of the 1993 Duma, the KPRF claimed high wages, villas, cars and pensions. Thus, while the Communists in theory are fighters against inequality, they are not strangers to the privileged lifestyle of the political elite. This lifestyle will complicate KPRF efforts to see their programs, based on an egalitarian ideology, realized without appearing hypocritical.

As further evidence to Gaidar's concerns, in a recent interview philanthropist George Soros said that Russia is experiencing "piratical capitalism" with the failure of legislative and financial control.¹ With these failures there has been extensive jockeying between com-

peting interests with regard to the division of the property of the former Soviet Union and the proper economic direction of the country. These interest groups form two camps—those who produce energy and resources and those who consume these resources. The first group is more open to reforms that allow for energy and resources to be sold abroad more easily, while the second group (industrial enterprises and military complexes) want subsidies and an artificial lowering of the price of energy and resources. This second group argues that there is a need for a closed economy. Soros thinks that this xenophobic rhetoric about the need to protect Russia against greedy foreign exploiters is just an ideological excuse for going back to the closed market for protection of the consumers of power and other resources.

(continued, please see p. 43)

(continued from p. 18)

If Soros is right, support from the industrial enterprises may give the Communists a needed boost to catapult them into serious presidential contention.

In addition to the support of industrial elites, recent surveys indicate that the majority of those who voted for the Communists are mostly from the older generation. Attempting to add to its base by gaining support from a younger generation will require the KPRF to take moderate steps toward social democracy and modify their image away from the old days of totalitarian communism. However, too much movement will generate conflict within the party and jeopardize support from the industrial elites.

Another bloc in the left worth considering in the upcoming presidential elections is the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO). The KRO is fa-

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mous for its proposed radical changes to the current reforms and for its bright leaders: Yuri Skokov, as a potential competitor for prime minister, and Alexander Lebed, as a candidate for president. This bloc has a strong base of support in most communities of Russia. In the 1995 Duma elections, the Yeltsin administration went to great lengths, including public addresses which were critical of the KRO, in an effort to make sure that the KRO did not pass the 5% mark in the party-list voting. KRO is a natural ally of the Communists, thus leaving open the opportunity for a powerful alliance in the presidential bid.

While there is concern over the direction of the Communist party, in all likelihood the modern Communists of the KPRF will not try to destroy the current democratic regime in Russia. This aim will be left to the radical political force—Communists-Labor Russia—for the Soviet Union (KTRSS), and its leader, Victor Anpilov. This political bloc got 4.5% in the party-list vote and one seat in the single-member voting. Most likely this percent represents the people who really want to see Russia return to its totalitarian self.

*Our Home is Russia (NDR)—
“the Right”*

In the Duma, the policies of the Yeltsin administration are represented by the NDR. The main base of support for the NDR comes from the energy and raw materials industries, which would benefit greatly in an open economy by selling their resources to foreign buyers. As the presidential election approaches, the NDR is considering both Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and President Boris Yeltsin as possible candidates. In all likelihood, a candidate will be announced by the end of the winter—once the party has had a chance to review each candidate’s current standing with the public.

Currently, in an effort to combat the recent Communist victory, NDR representatives in the Duma are calling on allies from other blocs to unify themselves with the NDR. Yeltsin’s party is also attempting to rebound from the loss by revamping its political strategy and addressing some of its mistakes in earlier policy decisions. Experts who have introduced various economic corrections believe these should provide some necessary relief to satisfy the citizens. However, these relief efforts (including forced reductions in the inflation rate, compensating the lost savings of the elderly, and building more affordable housing) are not inconsistent with a communist philosophy. It looks as though the NDR is moving somewhat toward the middle in an effort to regain strength.

Parties and Politics in Russia

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)—“the Nationalists”

In the 1993 Duma elections the LDPR got almost a quarter of the vote. What’s most surprising about this success is that the LDPR mostly campaigned on a nationalist-fascist platform. We believe that LDPR support was a direct result of the confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of power in October 1993 and the resulting coup. Under the guise of political and ideological disorder, the LDPR leader, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy was able to shine. Zhirinovskiy’s propaganda was aimed at many of the people who were confused with the current strife in politics and allowed the LDPR to gain significant support.

Today, with the current uncertainties in the political landscape, Zhirinovskiy may consider the political climate just right to allow him to make a run for the presidency. While the LDPR lost some strength in 1995, compared to 1993, in general, support remained high. What’s most interesting, given the LDPR’s maverick political positions, is that not one of the large political movements has been willing to challenge this party. At the same time, despite Zhirinovskiy’s nationalistic ideas he has not opposed the Yeltsin administration. In fact, the LDPR faction in the Duma supported most of the government steps and did not have any deep confrontations with other political parties. So, while Zhirinovskiy’s beliefs may run counter to most other major political positions, many believe that his first concern is his own well-being, which is why he will attempt to be friendly with any government.

Yabloko—“the Liberal Democrats”

“Yabloko” (which is named after its three leaders—Grigory Yavlinsky, Yuri Boldyrev, and Vladimir Lukin) is the smallest of the four blocs in the State Duma. Yabloko represents a small part of the large liberal democratic movement in Russia. In 1995, Yabloko lost many of its voters because of the primitive political ambitions of its leaders.

Parties and Politics in Russia

Founded in the late 1980s, the main appeal of this party was that it was composed of intelligentsia. With leaders like Yavlinsky, this party is knowledgeable, efficient, and politically brave. However, it is also young and inexperienced.

The liberal democratic movement is credited with the process of modernization occurring in Russia today. Nevertheless, they are losing political positions due to some of the qualities associated with their youth, their inability to consolidate forces with other parties, and their weak organizational structure. For example, in 1993 Russia's Democratic Choice (DVR), led by Yegor Gaidar, gained enough support to garner 76 seats in the Duma, but in 1995, it could not overcome the 5% threshold and only received 9 seats. As a result, the democrats are losing their political popularity and the question remains whether or not they can mount a serious presidential campaign. Most likely, the democrats in the Duma will align themselves with those who have more power, in order to gain political experience and maintain a presence in the future government. Currently, they cannot realisti-

cally offer any tangible benefits to the common people and thus do not have the necessary clout to gain large political successes.

Conclusion

Thus, as a whole, the political situation of Russia has shifted to the left, although it should not bring any dizzying pirouettes into Russian politics. Although the left is no longer in the opposition, this change does little to reduce the number of problems, both economic and social, that Russia has to address. In order to solve the problems, the Communist party has to make radical "new" changes, while in the spirit of Anpilov, not—as the recent election results have suggested—toward a return to a totalitarian society.

Ruling out the liberal democrats because of their inexperience, we can assume that the presidential campaign will be between the current ruling party of the NDR and the united left forces. As we see it, the political movement that starts compromising its position, moving toward the middle of the ideological spectrum, will prevail. The next presi-

dent will come from the party which is viewed as best suited to balance the social and economic interests of the electorate against the interests of business elites. That party will have to appeal to both sides—to those who will and to those who will not benefit in an open economy.

Endnote:

¹ Mr. George Soros is an American financier and philanthropist. To date, the Soros Foundation has invested more than 100 million dollars in Russia.



Vyacheslav Cherepanov is professor, Department of Sociology and Political Science, Kharkov State Polytechnic University and president, Independent Analytical Research Center (Ukraine). Igor Cherepanov is graduate assistant, The Roper Center.

Parties at the Crossroads

By Gary Ferguson

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, there has been an explosion in the number of political parties in the Russian Federation. A few months before the December 1995 State Duma Elections, some observers believed that as many as 200 political parties might qualify for the Duma ballot. Ultimately, 43 parties did in fact qualify to field candidates. However, only four parties were able to pass the required 5% threshold in party voting to earn seats in the party-list section of the Duma. With these four parties only collecting 50.5% of the total vote, almost half of Russia's voters, then, "wasted" their vote on parties which failed to meet this required minimum. (For a further explanation of the Russian Parliament, see page 17).

Political Party Evolution

With such a large number of parties and the resulting fragmentation in party voting, Russian parties and the Russian party system clearly are at an important point in their development. In order to determine how Russian voters feel about political parties, a significant portion of a national pre-election survey commissioned by the International Foundation for Election Systems was devoted to party-related questions.¹

The data indicate that while political parties have overcome a number of obstacles, they face many challenges in the future. First, a majority say political parties are necessary to democracy (69%). A majority of all age groups hold this view, and only 15% say that parties aren't necessary. In addition, a 42% plurality feel that, ideally, there should be several political parties rather than one (17%) or many (10%).

Further, a majority of Russians (58%) say that political parties are relevant to the concerns of the electorate. However, a 41% plurality cannot discern clear differences between the parties as to how they would solve the important problems facing the country.¹

Table 1
Supporters of the Largest Parties are Also the Most Politically Engaged

Those who say they support this party and say...:	"Interested in Politics"	Difference from National Response (nationwide 32%, interested in politics)	"Certain to Vote in Election"
Our Home is Russia (NDR)	54%	+22	51%
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)	51%	+19	61%
Yabloko	49%	+17	49%
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)	41%	+9	51%
Russia's Democratic Choice (DVR)	41%	+9	56%

Source: Survey by the International Foundation for Election Systems, July 1995.

Perhaps this is one of the reasons for one of the main challenges currently facing the parties—low membership. As of July, only 6% said that they considered themselves to be a member of a political party while 93% did not. Among those who supported one of the top eight political parties in the run-up to the December elections, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) had the highest percentage of those declaring themselves to be members of a party—and this was a mere 20%. Still, 51% of all those who said they are members of a party were members of the Communist party. All others were in single digits.

Accordingly, just 24% said they are more likely to support a candidate who is affiliated with a political party. However, it is important to note that a candidate's affiliation was more important to supporters of the four parties which qualified on the 1995 Duma party-list ballot—the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), 50%; Our Home is Russia (NDR), 49%; the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), 47%; and Yabloko, 33%. Only one other party's supporters, Russia's Democratic Choice (DVR)'s, were significantly more likely to support a party-affiliated candidate (38%).

Expectations About the Communist Vote

The success of the KPRF in the December elections, then, did not come

as a surprise to observers of the Russian electoral process. Our survey showed the Communists leading the ballot in July with 14%. Polls conducted closer to the election also indicated that the Communists, who ultimately received 22%, were well positioned to capture a plurality of voting. There were, however, other indicators that pointed to a strong showing by the Communists.

First of all, KPRF supporters were the most likely to vote. Among all voters, 73% said they were likely to vote but only 41% said they were *certain* to vote. Among Communist voters, 84% were likely to vote and 61% said they were certain to vote. This intensity was coupled with a higher interest in politics and government than most other parties' voters and helps explain the high degree of organizational activity among the KPRF's supporters that was reported by election observers.

In fact, our survey showed that supporters of the same five political parties mentioned above also had significantly higher interest in politics and government than other partisans (see Table 1).

It is important to note that the Women of Russia Party, which scored well in the July ballot test (11%) and appeared to be well-positioned in other polls, failed to cross the 5% threshold in December. There were, however, findings in the survey that foreshadowed a poor showing for Women of Russia. In particular, the survey showed that sup-

porters of Women of Russia expressed little interest in politics and government—just 19% in contrast with the numbers seen in Table 1. Further, Women of Russia supporters had the lowest likelihood of voting of the top eight parties tested (40% certain to vote).

Presidential Contenders

Basic factors such as interest in politics and likelihood of voting should be kept in mind when contemplating the electorate prior to the presidential election in June. The main contenders for the presidency at this time are Gennady Zyuganov of the KPRF; Grigory Yavlinsky, an economist and democratic reformer who heads the Yabloko bloc; Alexander Lebed, a retired Army general who was affiliated with the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) in the 1995 elections (but who could form an alliance with the Communists); and, of course, President Boris Yeltsin.

“ *If democratic reformers in Russia are to be successful, they must finally learn the lesson that politics is more than ideology and intellectualism. It is voter turnout, coalition building, and effective communications.* ”

Parties and Politics in Russia

Still another potential candidate is Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin who heads the NDR. Although Chernomyrdin has taken himself out of contention, many observers believe he may yet be a presidential candidate, particularly if Yeltsin is unable to run. No doubt, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy of the LDPR will be a part of the mix.

Of these candidates, Zyuganov's supporters have the highest intensity on the interest and activity scores. In fact, 60% of Zyuganov's supporters are interested in politics and government as compared with just 39% of Yavlinsky's supporters, 38% of Lebed's, 34% of Chernomyrdin's, 31% of Yeltsin's, and 29% of Zhirinovskiy's. Further, Zyuganov's supporters top the list of likely voters in the June presidential election.

Among all voters, 46% say they definitely will vote in that contest, while 30% probably will vote, 9% probably won't vote, and 8% definitely won't vote. Among candidate support groups, 73% of Zyuganov's supporters are definite voters as compared with 58% of Yeltsin's, 54% of Chernomyrdin's, 50% of Zhirinovskiy's, 49% of Lebed's, and 49% of Yavlinsky's. Given the lesson of December, the non-Communist presidential candidates clearly face a major organizational task if they are to prevail in the election scheduled for June. This is particularly true of Yavlinsky, whose supporters seem to exhibit less gusto, if not disdain, for the *process* of elections.

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

More difficult to measure has been support for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. The LDPR, which had just 4% in our poll, ultimately achieved 11% on election day. Polls taken as late as November gave them only 4-5% and even a December 6-12 poll by VTsIOM had them receiving only 7.6% of the vote.²

The Zhirinovskiy faction, which had received 22% in the 1993 election was largely written off in the run-up to the 1995 elections. For one thing, they faced competition from other nationalist and Communist factions. For another, Zhirinovskiy's flamboyant and inflammatory style had undermined his credibility with most voters and his supporters were thought to be a disorganized band of thugs. Repugnant though they may be, disorganized they are not; and 1995 proved to be the second consecutive election in which Zhirinovskiy and the LDPR were underestimated.

Part of the difficulty in measuring the LDPR vote may be a function of the "hidden vote" phenomenon Americans have experienced in elections involving controversial candidates such as George Wallace or David Duke. In this scenario, poll respondents who support a controversial candidate decline to give their true voting intention and, instead, say they are voting for a more socially acceptable candidate or that they are undecided.

“ *Certainly, some of the Communist vote may be attributable to nationalism, dissatisfaction with the current government, a longing for the order and security of the command economy, a desire to restore the Soviet Union, a rejection of the reforms instituted in recent years, or a rejection of Western influence in Russian life.* ”

Further, the true impact of effective organizational campaigns in Russian Parliamentary elections cannot be overlooked. Western election observers in Russia found that LDPR representatives were among the most savvy participants in the election process. They served on local election commissions and worked with the Central Election Commission. They knew their rights and filed effective protests when other parties tried to interfere with their advertising efforts. Most important, they ran an effective grassroots campaign that communicated their ballot position and nationalist platform to voters.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation

Most other parties were far less engaged at the local level. In fact, the organizational effectiveness exhibited by the LDPR was matched only by the Communist party. Certainly, some of the Communist vote may be attributable to nationalism, dissatisfaction with the current government, a longing for the order and security of the command economy, a desire to restore the Soviet Union, a rejection of the reforms instituted in recent years, or a rejection of Western influence in Russian life. Many such themes were part of the pre-election rhetorical discussion. As Gennady Zyuganov himself stated "You should understand that a clever propaganda worker and a skilled politician will never

Table 2
Intention to Vote in 1995 Duma Elections

Question: Do you intend to vote in the State Duma elections of 1995?

	Total	Age:	17-35	36-44	45-54	55-64	65 +
Certain to Vote	41%		29%	38%	46%	57%	54%
Total Will Vote	74%		68%	73%	76%	81%	80%

Source: Survey by the International Foundation for Election Systems, July 1995.

talk in the same language with different audiences."³

However, much of the Communist party's success in 1995 has to be attributed to a widespread national organization, a fine election monitoring and turnout effort, and a strong committed vote in the face of more fragmented opposition with a weak organizational base, less funding and, in the main, few practical campaign skills.

Although no exit polling numbers are available for the Duma elections, our pre-election polling clearly indicated that turnout would likely benefit the Communist party. Even with the high turnout indicated in the IFES poll, older voters were far more likely to vote in the Duma elections than younger people (see Table 2).

The Communist vote is largely comprised of older voters. In fact, 42% of all Communist voters are pensioners. We found that support for the Communists increased markedly with age (from 7% among those age 17-35 to 26% among voters age 65 and older) and that 49% of all Communist party supporters were age 55 and older. Support is strongest among older men as 31% of men age 55-64 and 35% of men age 65+ supported the Communists.

The perceived risk in accelerating generic turnout efforts toward young people was that the LDPR turnout would increase. As a result, there was some reluctance in the pro-democratic camp to target young voters heavily despite the fact that party support scores indicated that increased turnout among young voters would benefit democratic reform parties. Whether this, too, was a factor in improved Communist performance is unclear because of the absence of exit polling data. However, it seems likely from the last two election results that LDPR voters will be at the polls with or without a concerted get-out-the-vote effort aimed at young voters and that democratic parties might, indeed, have benefited from such an effort.

Looking Ahead

Like the parliamentary electorate, the presidential electorate is fragmented and support is divided among many contenders. Further, many of the same factors that affected the Duma elections will have an impact on the presidential contest. Dissatisfaction with the direction of the country (87% in our survey) is unlikely to subside as the problems facing the nation are long-term.

In addition, voters are extremely skeptical about the interests, motivations, and actions of elected officials and about government in general. More than half of all voters in our survey (54%) said that official corruption is common, and 56% indicated that officials in Moscow aren't capable of making improvements in their lives. In fact, only 5% said that elected officials are interested in "improving our lives" while 60% said officials are only interested in "helping themselves." Job approval scores, as well as the NDR's meager 10% of the vote in December, indicate that voters view the current government with particular contempt.

Most important is that young people tend to think that elected officials are not interested in their problems or concerns and as a result, are more marginal voters. Older voters, on the other hand, will turnout and are highly likely to support the Communist party's nominee. Indeed, our survey showed that 48% of Zyuganov's voters are age 60 or older.

At the time our survey was conducted, it appeared that Lebed and Yavlinsky had the most advantageous position with regard to the presidential election because of their high awareness, low negatives, and cross-over appeal. To some, however, Lebed's candidacy has been diminished somewhat because of his affiliation with the Congress of Russian Communities, which received only 4.3% in the Duma elections, as well as his own dismal performance as a candidate to date. Yavlinsky's chances were by no means enhanced by

the Yabloko's 6.9% showing in December. It remains to be seen whether he can rally, unify, and organize democratic forces in the next few months.

If democratic reformers in Russia are to be successful, they must finally learn the lesson that politics is more than ideology and intellectualism. It is voter turnout, coalition building, and effective communications. Both the Communist party and the LDPR have mastered the turnout and communications elements, and the Communists are actively building coalitions with other factions in the new Duma.

In the rough-and-tumble world of Russian politics, the extent of the fragmentation of the party vote has strong implications for the development of a party system in Russia as well as for the country's reform movement. The need for consolidation, pre-election coalition building, and basic campaign skills has never been clearer.

Endnotes:

¹ The author was a consultant to the International Foundation for Election Systems, and directed the 1995 IFES Russia Poll in which 4,070 personal interviews were conducted during July 1995. Interviewing was conducted by the Moscow-based Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI). The project director in Russia was Anna Andreenkova. The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Catherine Barnes, Chris Siddall, and Leanne McDonald at IFES and Richard Raquet of the Response Center in Philadelphia in the design and implementation of the survey.

² The 5% figure is from a VTsIOM poll published in *Izvestiya* on November 11, 1995. The 4% score is from a *Rossiyskiye Vesti* poll published on November 22, 1995 which appeared in an Associated Press story published in *USA Today* on December 16, 1995.

³ *New York Times* News Service, December 13, 1995.



*Gary Ferguson is vice president,
American Viewpoint, Inc.*